University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Management Faculty Publications

Management

8-2013

Anticipating, Preventing, and Surviving Secondary
Boycotts
Judith Schrempf-Stirling
University of Richmond, judith.stirling@richmond.edu

Douglas A. Bosse
University of Richmond, dbosse@richmond.edu

Jeffrey S. Harrison
University of Richmond, harrison@richmond.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/management-facultypublications
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, Business Law,
Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Operations and Supply Chain Management Commons,
and the Strategic Management Policy Commons
Recommended Citation
Schrempf-Stirling, Judith; Bosse, Douglas A.; and Harrison, Jeffrey S., "Anticipating, Preventing, and Surviving Secondary Boycotts"
(2013). Management Faculty Publications. 35.
http://scholarship.richmond.edu/management-faculty-publications/35

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Management at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Management Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

ANTICIPATING, PREVENTING AND SURVIVING SECONDARY BOYCOTTS

Judith Schrempf
Robins School of Business
University of Richmond
Richmond, VA 23173, USA
(804) 287‐6309
jschremp@richmond.edu
Douglas A. Bosse
Robins School of Business
University of Richmond
Richmond, VA 23173, USA
(804) 287‐1922
dbosse@richmond.edu
Jeffrey S. Harrison
Robins School of Business
University of Richmond
Richmond, VA 23173, USA
(804) 380‐9000
harrison@richmond.edu
Corresponding Author

1

ANTICIPATING, PREVENTING AND SURVIVING SECONDARY BOYCOTTS

ABSTRACT
Even the best stakeholder‐managed firms can suffer when they become the targets of a
secondary boycott, as recent headlines attest. A secondary boycott is a group’s refusal to
engage a target firm with which the group has no direct dispute in an attempt to sway
public opinion, draw attention to an issue, or influence the actions of a disputant. This
article provides a new perspective and tools for both scholars and managers concerned
with this phenomenon. Building on a stakeholder theory foundation, we examine possible
actions managers can take to avoid being surprised by a secondary boycott, propose
conditions that raise the probability of becoming the target of a secondary boycott, and
develop four alternative approaches for managing stakeholder relationships in a world of
secondary boycotts, consistent with the underlying stakeholder culture of the firm.

Key Words: Secondary boycotts; boycotts; stakeholder theory; stakeholder influence
strategies; gay rights; Target; J. C. Penney; Citizens United

2

TARGET CORP. UNDER FIRE
Minnesota‐based retailer Target Corp. is a $70 billion company recognized for being
a good corporate citizen with respectful stakeholder engagement practices. The firm is
known by consumers for providing fashion at low prices, works with its suppliers to ensure
that the products sold in its stores are produced responsibly, and spends five percent of
income to support community grants and programs. The company’s efforts are
acknowledged by third parties on lists such as “100 Best Corporate Citizens” (Corporate
Responsibility Magazine) and “Top 50 Companies for Diversity” (DiversityInc magazine).
Ethisphere Institute names Target one of the most ethical companies worldwide.
However, in spite of the effort and resources Target invests in satisfying its
stakeholders, the company suffered recently as a result of damaging stakeholder dynamics.
Target donated $150,000 to a pro‐business group that supported Minnesota governor
candidate Tom Emmer. Unfortunately for Target, this ordinary donation turned into a
costly problem. Several Minnesota‐based civil society organizations (CSOs) (especially gay
and lesbian groups) vehemently opposed Emmer’s candidacy because of his conservative
stance on gay and lesbian rights. Given Target’s diversity policies and activities that include
benefits for domestic partners and the sponsorship of local gay events such as the Out &
Equal Workplace Summit, local gay and lesbian groups were especially confused by the
company’s support of Emmer. The CSOs responded by mobilizing Target’s workers to raise
their voice, informed the company’s customers about its support of a political candidate
who is on the other side of the issue, and encouraged them to boycott Target, with the
intent to ultimately hurt Emmer’s campaign (Birkey, 2010).
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Target was a victim of a secondary boycott. Whereas a (primary) boycott is a
group’s refusal to engage with a target firm that is acting in ways that are offensive to the
group, a secondary boycott is a group’s refusal to engage a target firm with which the group
has no direct dispute in an attempt to sway public opinion, draw attention to an issue, or
influence the actions of a disputant. Instead of pressuring candidate Emmer directly, the
CSOs exploited their influence over Target’s primary stakeholders to make their voices
heard. Target CEO Gregg Steinhafel issued an apology for the company’s involvement,
stating that although he is pro‐business, he did not anticipate that the donation would
disappoint Target’s team members or customers. Emmer lost the election.
Even more recently, at the beginning of 2012, J. C. Penney faced a secondary boycott
by anti‐gay groups. J. C. Penney had recently hired the comedian Ellen DeGeneres because
of her popularity and her image as a person people trust. DeGeneres is also openly lesbian
and a strong advocate for gay rights. Anti‐gay groups called for a boycott of J.C. Penney
until the company ends its relationship with DeGeneres. The outrage about DeGeneres’
pro‐gay attitude surprised J.C. Penney (Bruni, 2012).
Target and J.C. Penney are generally recognized as role models for their successful
stakeholder management. Stakeholder theory states that good stakeholder management
can be a source of above‐normal performance and competitive advantage (Freeman, 1984).
Some companies, however, seem to consider their stakeholders’ needs carefully, but still
suffer performance problems as a result of secondary boycotts. The objectives of this
article are to extend stakeholder theory to increase our understanding of secondary
boycotts and to provide managers with insights about how they can protect their firms
against them.
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Our approach involves expanding stakeholder theory by proposing a supplemental
perspective: in addition to the needs and interests of primary stakeholders such as
customers, suppliers and employees, firms should consider the societal issues that are of
concern to those stakeholders. That is, societal issues have stakeholders, too, and to the
extent that a firm’s primary stakeholders are also stakeholders to a societal issue, the firm
needs to be sensitive to those issues as well. To supplement the standard stakeholder map
that puts the firm in the center surrounded by stakeholders, we propose an issue‐focused
stakeholder map with issues in the center. Many issue‐driven groups (especially CSOs)
have a surprising amount of influence on firms when they use a secondary boycott strategy
to affect change. They can focus on an issue and approach any stakeholder who is directly
or indirectly connected to the issue that they are fighting for (or against). An issue‐focused
stakeholder map helps corporations become aware of societal issues and their connections
to them.
Based on this novel perspective, we examine steps managers can take to prevent
being surprised by a secondary boycott. This discussion leads to factors that raise the
probability a firm will become a target of a secondary boycott. Finally, we discuss
alternative approaches for managing stakeholder relationships in a world of secondary
boycotts.
WHAT STAKEHOLDER THEORY SAYS
Stakeholder theory originated as a theory of competitive advantage with a moral
foundation (Freeman, 1984). A stakeholder is any actor with an interest in the activities
and outcomes of an organization and upon whom the organization depends to achieve its
own purposes. A general proposition of stakeholder theory is that firms that better serve
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the needs and interests of their various stakeholders will, in turn, be better served by those
stakeholders. This exchange of consideration is reflected in the roles played by strategic
and moral stakeholders (Goodpastor, 1991). Strategic stakeholders are those who affect
the achievement of a firm’s objectives. Hence, it is of strategic importance for the firm to
manage those stakeholder relationships to (at least) avoid any negative economic
consequences. Moral stakeholders, on the other hand, are those affected by a firm’s
activities. Whether a firm’s activities have a positive or negative affect on another actor,
and whether those affects are intended or unintended, the firm has moral responsibility for
its actions.
It is unrealistic and impractical, however, to suggest that managers are responsible
to all the actors their firm could possibly affect in any way. Consequently, various
perspectives have been developed to assist in determining which stakeholders are or
should be most salient to managers as they establish strategic priorities and make
important decisions. One of the most widely accepted perspectives argues that firms give
priority to stakeholders which posses one, two or all of the following characteristics: power
(influence on the firm’s ability to achieve desired outcomes), legitimacy (socially accepted
relationship to the firm), and urgency (time sensitivity of the stakeholder’s claim)(Mitchell,
Agle, and Wood, 1997).
Another perspective, based on the principle of fairness, suggests that managers
should pay particular attention to the needs of stakeholders from whom they have
voluntarily received resources (Phillips, 2003). Either of these perspectives leads to the
identification of a firm’s “primary” stakeholders, and a typical stakeholder map looks
something like Figure 1, where primary external stakeholders would include customers,
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business partners, communities, and suppliers of raw materials, technology, financing and
other key resources. These stakeholders might also be considered primary because they
are a part of the firm’s production core. Employees and owners are also stakeholders, and
would be classified inside the firm in Figure 1.
(Insert Figure 1 about here)
Stakeholders possess economic power to the extent that a firm depends on them to
supply financial or other resources. However, another source of power is what might be
called an influencer stake (Frooman, 1999; Freeman, 1984). Stakeholders that only possess
this type of power are considered secondary stakeholders and, although they may not be
given the same priority in decisions as primary stakeholders, firms that neglect them do so
at their peril. They are not a part of the production core nor do they provide physical
resources the firm needs, but they have the ability to affect firm outcomes and they use this
power to attempt to influence firm decisions. CSOs fall into this category.
The existence, and importance, of secondary stakeholders is one reason that a pure
utilitarian approach to stakeholder management is impractical. Establishing as a primary
firm objective the creation of the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people
(Bentham, 1776) means that minority groups with small numbers are likely to be neglected
and could actually be hurt by the actions of the firm. However, according to stakeholder
theory, these minority groups can have a meaningful impact on a firm’s ability to achieve
its business objectives.
Traditional stakeholder theory, then, provides a foundation for considering societal
issues as represented by CSOs. First, from an instrumental perspective, a CSO can hurt the
firm’s progress towards its objectives. Second, a firm that genuinely considers the well
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being of its primary stakeholders should be concerned about those things that matter to
them. Finally, stakeholder theory suggests that a firm should establish a well‐defined set of
values and should work to ensure that those values are demonstrated through its decisions
and actions (Freeman and Gilbert, 1988; Jones, Felps, and Bigley, 2007).
EVOLUTION OF STAKEHOLDER DEMANDS: TOWARDS SECONDARY BOYCOTTS
Primary stakeholders, in their normal interactions with firms, evaluate their
perceptions of the firm based on their expectations for justice and fairness (Bosse, Phillips,
and Harrison, 2009). When they perceive they are being treated better than expected, they
positively reciprocate towards the firm. On the other hand, when they feel unfairly treated
or negatively affected they seek to improve their situation. Examples include employee
demands for a safe working place or higher salaries, supplier demands for more favorable
contract terms, or demands by local communities to take responsibility for environmental
degradation (Human Rights Watch, 1995).
One very powerful tool stakeholders have to influence firms is a boycott, which is an
“attempt by one or more parties to achieve certain objectives” by refusing to purchase
products or services from a target firm (Friedman, 1985: 97). Friedman (1999)
distinguishes four kinds of boycotts. An instrumental boycott aims at changing a specific
policy or action of the target firm. A catalytic boycott aims at raising awareness about a
company’s activity or policy. The boycott, here, is a publicity tool. An expressive boycott
aims at generally expressing one’s displeasure about the target, though the intended
outcome can be rather vague. A punitive boycott aims at punishing the target for its
behavior. The ultimate goal is to cause harm to the target irrespective of whether the
company would be willing to change or cooperate.
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Stakeholder demands towards corporations have evolved considerably from a
narrow focus on issues directly related to the stakeholder‐firm relationship to a broad
focus on issues within the corporate sphere of influence (Schrempf, 2012). Since the mid
1990s, self‐declaring stakeholders have started to approach corporations on behalf of
corporations’ primary stakeholders. CSOs, for example, make large Western corporations
responsible for the bad working conditions in their contractors’ independent offshore
factories – the so‐called sweatshop problematic (Petersen, 1992; The National Labor
Committee, 1995; Sethi, 2003). The CSO community perceived the corporate search for
higher profit margins as a key component for bad working conditions in supplier factories
(such as below minimum wages and unsafe working environments). The sweatshop debate
of the 1990s (Petersen, 1992; Sluiter, 2009) or the more recent debate about conflict
minerals (Steinweg et al., 2007) are examples of this extension.
Even though the term was not widely used to describe it, the sweatshop controversy
of the 1990s was a secondary boycott. It was not employees who demanded better contract
terms from their employer (the supplier). Instead, international CSOs spoke on behalf of
those primary stakeholders and initiated boycotts against the suppliers’ customers such as
Nike or The Gap to pressure these companies to improve working conditions along their
supply chain (Schrempf, 2012; Sluiter, 2009).
The Target example from the introduction shows that stakeholder demands have
broadened even further. As in the sweatshop debate, secondary stakeholders approach a
company. This time, however, they base their demands towards the corporation on a
relatively loose connection between the corporation and the issue. Until gay groups
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approached Target, the firm had probably never imagined that gay rights might be
something that would embroil the firm.
Secondary boycotts of advertisers are also becoming more common. A firm that
places an ad on a radio talk show, for example, does so because its strategy involves
marketing to the same demographic that listens to that show. The firm does not expect to
control the content of such a show, so it can be surprised when the public holds it
accountable for positions taken by the talk show host. In early 2012 millions of consumers
used online social media to organize a secondary boycott of advertisers on radio host Rush
Limbaugh’s show because they were offended by his inflammatory treatment of a pro
birth‐control advocate named Sandra Fluke. Some of the advertisers suffered significant
revenue losses even though the boycotters’ dispute was not with them, but with Limbaugh.
The secondary boycott worked; Limbaugh was forced to apologize for his commentary in
order to stem the loss of advertisers from his show.
While these examples of secondary boycotts may appear similar, there are
important differences. Contrast the Target and Nike cases: Nike’s actions (increased profit
margins through outsourcing) contributed to the continuity of sweatshops while Target’s
campaign contribution did not contribute to candidate Emmer’s anti‐gay position. Emmer’s
agenda towards gay and lesbian rights was independent of Target’s business activities. This
cannot be said for the Nike case. These contrasts illustrate that managers need to be aware
of how vulnerable their business can be to secondary boycotts. Even if corporate activities
do not directly advance any specific harmful or criticized issue (e.g., sweatshops, child
labor), corporations might become subjects of secondary boycotts.
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Furthermore, although secondary boycotts may seem unfair, especially to their
targets, and although they are certainly capable of causing material damage, the law is
unlikely to provide much protection. In fact, a 2010 U.S. Supreme Court ruling is one
indication that the law may be moving in the other direction. In their ruling on the case of
Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme Court overturned a previous
decision against Citizens United, a conservative non‐profit organization (Sachs, 2012).
Citizens United was prohibited by a lower court from advertising or paying to show a film
that was damaging to Hillary Clinton, a presidential hopeful, within 30 days of the
Democratic Primaries. The lower court decision was based on the 2002 Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act (McCain‐Feingold Act) that restricted corporations or unions from
supporting an “electioneering communication” just prior to primaries or general elections.
In overturning the ruling, the Supreme Court argued that this was a violation of the First
Amendment regarding free speech. President Obama harshly criticized the ruling, saying it
would create “a stampede of special‐interest money in our politics (Smith, 2011: A15).”
The Citizens United ruling seems to establish a precedent for allowing CSOs latitude
in pressuring political candidates through a variety of means, as in the case of candidate
Emmer. The ruling might also be interpreted as moving the legal pendulum in the direction
of protecting the rights of groups to speak freely against other entities, such as
corporations.
A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE: FROM STAKEHOLDER MAPPING TO ISSUE MAPPING
Several years ago, the British utility firm United Utilities became the target of a
secondary boycott. One of its managers summarized his experience as follows:
“As a water utility we are a major landowner. We have been approached by
representatives from the anti‐hunting league and asked to stop renting out a parcel
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of land for use by sports‐hunters. To be honest, we don’t particularly have a
corporate view on hunting, and do not particularly want to have one. Where does
this all end? If there is a church but no mosque on our land, will we eventually have
to have a view on God? (Zadek, 2001: 156).”
If asked, Target managers would probably report their Emmer experience in a
similar way. What tools are available to managers to help them better understand these
sorts of issues? Stakeholder theory traditionally puts the corporation in the center of a
stakeholder map (Figure 1). Werhane (1999), however, suggests putting a stakeholder in
the center of a stakeholder map. The advantage of this perspective change is that it can help
determine the stakeholder’s obligations towards the focal corporation (Phillips, 2003). This
“moral imagination” helps the corporation in anticipating stakeholders’ demands and
expectations (Werhane, 1999; Frooman, 1999).
Extending this idea, we propose putting a societal issue in the center of a map,
where CSOs serve as representatives of that issue (see Figure 2). Such a map is consistent
with the perspective of CSOs. They are founded for a cause (e.g., fight child labor or protect
human rights worldwide), and they focus on which actors are directly (primary
stakeholder) or indirectly (secondary stakeholder) connected to that cause.
(Insert Figure 2 about here)
An issue‐focused stakeholder map is beneficial to the corporation for several
reasons. First, this perspective can help corporations to flag societal issues that would fall
under the table using a traditional stakeholder map due to the focus on primary
stakeholder relationships. Second, an issue‐focused stakeholder map provides
corporations with a better overview of how far they are actually connected to some of the
most pressing societal issues of the time. This connection indicates a corporation’s
vulnerability to secondary boycotts, but also a corporation’s ability to contribute to a
12

solution of societal issues. Third, an issue‐focused stakeholder map helps expand the
classic stakeholder questions such as “who is our stakeholder” or “how many resources
should we dedicate to each stakeholder group” (Harrison & Bosse, forthcoming) to new
questions such as “what are the most pressing issues in our society today and how are we
connected” or “how can we contribute to solve societal issues”. Finally, an issue‐focused
stakeholder map offers a more balanced (neutral) perspective that all stakeholders
(including the focal corporation but also initiators of secondary boycotts) can share. This
perspective is useful for corporations to understand the reasoning of initiators of
secondary boycotts that might target them.
We suggest managers do four things to derive practical value from this new
perspective.


Step one: Keep a short list of topical issues. While some societal issues are
perpetually topical (e.g., various human rights), others make headlines for a
comparatively short time (e.g., federally mandated healthcare in the U.S.).



Step two: Discuss and decide whether the firm wants to take a stand on each of the
issues on the short list.



Step three: Consider how managerial decisions (e.g., funding a politician,
outsourcing production, etc.) will likely be perceived by the stakeholders of each
topical issue. Target was negatively influenced by an issue (gay rights) that it had
already decided to support.



Step four: Be prepared to react to secondary boycotts quickly to effectively signal
the firm’s stance – or intended distance – on the issue. The key factor here is
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whether the firm has a primary stakeholder that is also a primary stakeholder of the
societal issue. Figure 3 depicts the situation in general terms.
(Insert Figure 3 about here)
As discussed in the next section, it is crucial for corporations to know their “enemy”,
i.e. to understand how distant stakeholders choose their secondary boycott targets.
KNOW YOUR ENEMY
The secondary boycotts examples discussed thus far provide us with some
information about how CSOs or other secondary stakeholder groups select their boycott
targets. We present three criteria here that will be useful for managers: corporate power,
benefitting from harm/issue, and the corporation’s CSR reputation. Frooman (1999)
developed stakeholder influence strategies that are similar to what we develop below, but
our emphasis is on the inverse direction of influence.
Corporate Power
An obvious criterion for how a group selects its boycott target might simply be the
powerful position of the prospective target company. Power, here, can be interpreted in
several ways: First, power might refer to a corporation’s independence from the primary
stakeholder it shares with the issue. This enables the targeted company to easily cease any
relationship with the stakeholder. Depending on the issue, ending a business relationship
with a primary stakeholder might already be enough to improve the situation. For instance,
it might be that there are numerous groups that would be happy to rent United Utilities’
land. So, the company might not be dependent on renting its land to the hunting group.
Hence, United Utilities is powerful in that it can simply switch its primary stakeholders.
This of course, might make it easy for the target company to make the boycott go away. It
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simply washes its hands clean by cutting any relationship with the “troublemaker”
stakeholder.
Second, power can refer to the corporation’s ability to affect change at its primary
stakeholder. Here, power can be interpreted as influence that the firm has over its primary
stakeholder’s activities. Again, a company’s influence over its primary stakeholder can be
high if the company’s primary stakeholder is dependent on the company. In this case, there
might be a higher chance that the company can pressure the primary stakeholder to change
its behavior or position by threatening it to end their business relationship. Staying with
the United Utilities case, if United Utilities is the only opportunity for the hunting group to
hunt, then United Utilities has an enormous power and might be the only actor who is able
to stop that particular hunting group from hunting. Or, United Utilities might at least be in a
position to find a compromise such as hunting only a certain amount of a specific animal.
Finally, power can also be interpreted as a company’s ability to foster joint action.
When CSOs started criticizing corporations’ outsourcing practices and the consequences on
working conditions, CSOs first targeted the leaders in the different industries to pressure
them to improve working conditions, hoping that this induces other companies in the
industry to do the same. Once the initial target companies have improved, the activists
switch their emphasis to the next tranche of companies they seek to change (Connor,
2002).
This logic can also be found in recent secondary boycott examples. Gay groups
probably approached Target because they perceived the company as a powerful
corporation and envisioned that if Target stops its support of candidate Emmer, then this
might create a snowball effect that other corporations might follow. This, then, could
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(hypothetically) encourage Emmer (and his party) to put the gay rights debate aside or
even change his position.
From this discussion, the following three factors can help managers to evaluate the
risk of becoming a secondary boycott target:
1. If a corporation is not dependent on the primary stakeholder it shares with the issue,
the corporation is less likely to become a secondary boycott target.
2. If the primary stakeholder a corporation shares with the issue is dependent on the
corporation, the corporation is more likely to become a secondary boycott target.
3. If a corporation can function as a role model by inspiring other stakeholders to
pressure the primary stakeholder to change, then the corporation is more likely to
become a secondary boycott target.
Dirty Hands
While the secondary boycott examples discussed so far show that stakeholder
groups target powerful corporations, the United Utilities case illustrates a further criterion
that induces stakeholders to launch a boycott. Secondary boycotters may target
corporations that benefit from the shared primary stakeholder’s position on the issue.
United Utilities financially benefitted from renting out land to the hunting group even
though land rental is not actually the company’s core business. In the eyes of the anti‐
hunting groups, however, the British company made its hands dirty by accepting dirty
money from hunting groups. The Target and J.C. Penney examples are slightly different, as
the two companies did not intend to benefit from the anti‐gay and pro‐gay positions of
Emmer and DeGeneres, respectively. Instead, Target probably assumed that it would be
strategically beneficial to support the pro‐business politician Emmer. J. C. Penney chose
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DeGeneres because of her popularity and reputation as a person consumers trust. So, in the
eyes of the stakeholder groups that initiated secondary boycotts against those firms, their
motivation was different compared to the anti‐hunting case.
Corporations, then, should be aware of the potential to face a secondary boycott if
they benefit from controversial (according to the point of view of secondary stakeholders)
activities or positions of their own primary stakeholders as summarized in the following
factor.
4. If a corporation benefits (financially or non‐financially) from the controversial
activities of the primary stakeholder it shares with the issue, then the corporation is
more likely to become a secondary boycott target.
CSR Reputation
While being powerful or benefitting from controversial stakeholder relationships
are already good indicators for becoming a secondary boycott target, a third indicator is
worth considering: a good CSR reputation. Corporations with a positive CSR reputation
might perceive themselves as being less likely to become boycott targets, but this
represents a sense of false security. As discussed at the beginning of the article, Target has
a good CSR reputation. OutFront Minnesota, one of the gay groups that launched the
secondary boycott against Target considers the company as a “strong ally” of the Minnesota
gay community and “a model of the corporate support for diversity” (OutFront, 2010).
Target’s strong reputation became the company’s undoing as its support for candidate
Emmer was inconsistent with the company’s diversity reputation. Hence, a good CSR
reputation is not a guarantee to be spared from secondary boycott calls. On the contrary, a
good CSR reputation might make corporations more vulnerable to boycotts as the smallest
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inconsistency can be enough to question the corporation’s authenticity. A company with a
good CSR reputation might also be more responsive to boycotts and public outcry since its
reputation and credibility are on the line. So, stakeholder groups might especially choose
corporations with a strong CSR reputation for boycott targets as they expect a higher
positive response rate. This CSR reputation discussion leads us to a final factor managers
should consider when assessing the potential for a secondary boycott:
5. If a corporation is known as a good corporate citizen, it is more likely to become a
secondary boycott target if its primary stakeholder’s offense is inconsistent with the
corporation’s CSR reputation.
MANAGING SECONDARY BOYCOTTS AS A TARGETTED CORPORATION
The previous section provided information about how a distant stakeholder group
might identify its boycott targets. This is helpful for managers to assess their company’s
risk of becoming a boycott target by secondary stakeholders. Equally relevant for a
manager is how to avoid becoming a target of secondary boycotts and how to deal with an
actual secondary boycott. We outline four general approaches firms might use in
attempting to avoid secondary boycotts or, if faced with one, how they might respond. On
one end of the spectrum is the “business as usual” attitude, i.e. do nothing, while at the
other end of the spectrum is a collaboration with other stakeholders to find long‐term
solutions. We elaborate on how each of the approaches is consistent with specific
stakeholder cultures (Jones et al. 2007) and on the likely success of each of the approaches.
Egoist: Business As Usual
The first option for corporations is to do nothing special regarding the potential
threat of a secondary boycott. With this approach, the corporation continues to rely on a
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focus on its primary stakeholders in the belief that a proper management of primary
stakeholders is enough to create and protect firm value. Any additional investment in
examining the constantly changing range of issues that might share a primary stakeholder
and the related potential of secondary boycotts is perceived as too time and resource
consuming. This attitude corresponds to what Jones et al. (2007) refer to as an egoist
stakeholder culture. Such a culture focuses on the company’s short‐term economic success.
While doing nothing is inexpensive in the short‐term, it comes with high risk for a
large corporation. This business‐as‐usual approach might work best for small, less
powerful corporations that do not benefit from a controversial relationship with the
primary stakeholder it shares with the controversial issue. If a company is small and
perceived as being not powerful enough to make any changes, there is a low likelihood that
this company becomes a boycott target in the first place, consistent with the first three
factors identified in the last section. When corporations have such a small possibility of
becoming victims of secondary boycotts, then doing nothing might actually be the most
cost‐effective approach.
Observer: Regularly Scanning the Environment
The second option for corporations is to regularly scan their environment for the
potential of secondary boycotts. These scans can include the creation of issue‐focused
stakeholder maps (see Figure 2) and ongoing dialogues with primary stakeholders to
understand the issues on which they take a clear position. The issue‐focused stakeholder
map and the stakeholder dialogues will enable corporations to detect potential threats and
make adjustments where necessary.
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Continuously scanning the broad external environment for threats of secondary
boycotts is generally consistent with Jones et al.’s (2007) instrumentalist stakeholder
culture. While the corporation might forgo some short‐term profits given its investment in
scanning the environment and potential secondary boycott threats, this approach can help
to avoid future losses by making arrangements to quickly drop or change a stakeholder
who is involved in a contentious issue the firm wishes to avoid. Observing and scanning the
environment for all potential secondary boycott threats is done out of self‐preservation.
A slightly refined implementation of this approach is to narrow consideration only
to those issues on which the firm has explicitly decided to take a stand. Vulnerable
corporations are advised to follow this approach, as this is consistent with its good CSR
reputation (consistent with the fifth factor). Good corporate citizens are expected to
behave well. Observing the environment and thereby identifying specific risks is consistent
with is generally consistent with a stakeholder culture of enlightened self‐interest (Jones et
al., 2007).
The Neutral Party: Middle of The Road
A third approach is to attempt to position the firm on both sides of a contentious
societal issue by spreading the firm’s efforts evenly (i.e. assembling stakeholders in one’s
network who represent both sides of the issue). We call this approach “middle of the road.”
By supporting both sides, the company might try to offset any negative attitudes by
referring to its good deeds. So, if a company is confronted with a secondary boycott, it could
simply jump into action by pointing out its support of the other side, too. United Utilities,
for instance, could rent out land to hunting clubs, but financially support anti‐hunting
groups.
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While this approach appears to create harmony and avoid bad publicity from
secondary boycotts, it has severe disadvantages. First, it is a costly approach, as the
company needs to allocate resources to satisfying a variety of stakeholders with very
diverse positions. Second, it is dangerous because the company is not being consistent in its
own behavior and values. A middle of the road approach might actually do more harm than
good, leading to a loss in credibility. When a company is confronted with a secondary
boycott it has to realize that there might not be a middle way or a compromise. There is no
“we are a bit for and a bit against gay rights.” J.C. Penney did not fall into the trap of looking
for a compromise when anti‐gay groups announced their secondary boycott against the
corporation (Bruni, 2012). The company kept DeGeneres as its spokesperson and stressed
its positive attitude towards same sex couples by including gay couples in its print ads
(Bruni, 2012).
Target did not adopt a middle position either. Target is very pro‐diversity and has a
history that reflects an excellent relationship with the gay community. The donation to the
pro‐business group supporting candidate Emmer was seen as inconsistent with Target’s
values. Target’s CEO used his apology not as an opportunity to try to take a middle position,
but to reaffirm the company’s stance on the importance of diversity.
Given this reasoning, a position in the middle is probably not an advisable long‐term
approach, as the company might not be perceived as authentic or consistent, thereby losing
credibility. As in private life, corporations might be better off admitting a misjudgment and
engaging in corrective action rather than attempting to support both sides of an issue.
Collaborator: Be Part of The Solution
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The opposite extreme from the do‐nothing approach (egoist) is to actively
collaborate with others to find solutions to topical issues. The idea behind this approach is
to engage in productive dialogue with the potential initiators of secondary boycotts to
understand the problem and get ideas for potential solutions. A solution might involve
collaboration among several stakeholders, including the boycotted one and the prospective
initiator of a boycott.
Corporations with a moralist stakeholder culture are most likely to follow this
approach (Jones et al., 2007). A moralist stakeholder culture is characterized by a “concern
for all stakeholders and adherence to principles regardless of economic temptations to
discard them” (Jones et al., 2007, 149). In contrast to the observer who is driven by
enlightened self‐interest, the collaborator is motivated by doing good and finding a solution
that is beneficial to all stakeholders.
Being a collaborator and participating in the solution is most advisable and most
likely to be successful if the corporation enjoys power within its stakeholder network. It
does not matter whether this power originates from the corporation’s independence of its
primary stakeholders, its primary stakeholders’ dependence on the corporation, or its
leverage over other stakeholders. Being in a powerful position raises the demands and
expectations of secondary stakeholders. So, powerful corporations that are confronted with
secondary boycotts might face even more criticism if they do nothing as they are perceived
as being an entity that can affect change.
These four approaches are not mutually exclusive. Although the egoist approach
(business as usual) is a stand‐alone strategy, the other three approaches could be applied
in parallel. A corporation could, for instance, regularly scan its environment (observer). If it
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gets involved in a secondary boycott, the company might decide to actively participate in
finding a solution with the involved parties (collaborator). In a similar vein, a corporation
can regularly scan its environment and, in addition, spread its stakeholder management
practices to please every stakeholder (neutral player). If the corporation then becomes a
target of a secondary boycott, it might decide to collaborate with the parties involved. As
previously mentioned, the corporation might have to give up this middle of the road
approach at one point because it might cause more harm than good.
IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGERS AND BUSINESS SCHOLARS
Next to the practical implications for managers, this article offers an extension of
stakeholder theory. We contribute to the existing stakeholder literature by proposing an
issue‐focused stakeholder map. Also, this article examines a phenomenon that has become
business reality. Corporations are increasingly considered as being part of issue‐focused
stakeholder maps, thereby bearing a responsibility to act. While this article extends
stakeholder theory to incorporate secondary boycotts, we abstain from any normative
discussion about their legitimacy or morality, leaving these topics instead to future
discussion. Also interesting would be research on the efficacy of secondary boycotts. Which
factors determine whether secondary stakeholders are successful in triggering the focal
corporation to act according to their demands?
This article discusses the phenomenon of secondary boycotts and provides useful
lessons for managers and scholars. For managers, we elaborate on their vulnerability of
becoming a target of a secondary boycott. We provide managers with some guidance on
how to answer questions such as “how are we connected to the most pressing issues in our
society today?” or “how can we contribute to solve societal issues?” We elaborate on the
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likelihood of corporations becoming targets of secondary boycotts and illustrate how
secondary stakeholder groups might choose their targets. Also, we provide some guidance
on how corporations can avoid becoming targets of secondary boycotts or how they might
react if they are boycotted.
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Figure 1: Traditional Stakeholder Map
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Figure 2: Issue‐focused Stakeholder Map
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Figure 3: Secondary Boycott
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